Cornell–Syracuse Philosophy Graduate Students Workshop

The Syracuse University Department of Philosophy is excited to host the first Cornell-Syracuse Philosophy Graduate Student Workshop! The workshop will take place all day September 13 in Hall of Languages 500, and is organized by Antonio Freiles (Syracuse) and Gus Turyn (Cornell). Please see below for the schedule:

Breakfast: 9:30 - 10 a.m.

Talk #1: 10 - 11:30 a.m.

Anni Sun (Cornell University): "Inheritance and Action Entailment: A Proposal Against the Decision-Theoretic Account of 'Ought'.”

Abstract: Whether deontic "ought" is closed under entailment remains puzzling. As pointed out by Blumberg and Hawthorne (2023), people have wavering intuitions even about the same case, and existing accounts that support one will lose their appeal for the other. To address the puzzle, Blumberg and Hawthorne offer a decision-theoretic account of ``ought’’, which is supposed to make the correct predictions for all the relevant data. In this paper, I argue that this account provides an insufficient diagnosis of the puzzle. There are cases with the same structure of deontic sentences which cannot be explained by their semantics, and there are very similar puzzles arising with other modals and attitude verbs that call for a broader solution. In response, I propose that the puzzle stems from the ambiguity of action entailment. In particular, I show that there are two readings of the entailment relation between sentences about actions in natural language. I provide a truth-maker semantics that can account for this ambiguity, which then gives us a more satisfying solution to the puzzle.  

Comments by Jan Dowell (Syracuse University)

Talk #2: 11:40 a.m.  - 1:10 p.m.

Seungho Jo (Syracuse University):  "Intention as Motivation.”

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to suggest a new reductionist view on intention that may capture the nature of intention. On this view, intention is taken to be a type of motivation: to intend to do A is to be motivated in a certain way. Call this view the motivation theory of intention. The important task for this view is to explain what motivation is and the conditions under which being motivated counts as intending. What is motivation? This paper suggests that motivation is a sui generis mental state whose characteristic role is to initiate and sustain one’s action. What is intention? This paper suggests that intention is motivation or motivation disposition formed by practical reasoning. Lastly, I will argue that the motivation theory helps explain the central features of intention.

Comments by Joseph Orttung (NYU Bersoff Faculty Fellow)

Lunch: 1:10 - 2 p.m.

Talk #3: 2 - 3:30 p.m.

Guyu Zhu (Cornell University): “Fundamentality in Ability Modals.”

Abstract: I argue that some abilities are more fundamental than other abilities. For instance, an ability to lift a 20 kg dumbbell is more fundamental than the ability to lift a 30kg dumbbell. It is hard to conceive how one can have the latter ability without having the former, more fundamental, ability. Similarly, in skill-building, acquiring the ability to lift heavier weights depends on acquiring the ability to lift lighter weights. An important formal feature is that this relationship can relate abilities with logically independent prejacents. A noteworthy negative consequence is that fundamentality or dependence invalidates the important modal principle that abilities entail circumstantial possibilities, able(S, φ, C) ⊨ ◇(S, φ, C). To formally represent this relationship, I develop a novel proposal which introduces an independent subject matter component to ability modals, an action topic quantifying over actions. Drawing on this account, I propose a weaker principle to represent the relationship between abilities and possibilities.

Comments by Michael Rieppel (Syracuse University)

Talk #4: 3:40 - 5:10 p.m.

Victor Sholl (Syracuse University): “Worthy Opponents: A Defence of the Value of Rivalries.”

Abstract: Rivalries, perhaps because of negative associations, have been underappreciated in the well-being literature. This paper seeks to remedy this—I'll argue that some rivalries are non-instrumentally good for us. I show that many features that are commonly cited in accounts about the value of friendship are also found in rivalries—love being the major exception. I then point to a feature of relationships that I defend constitutes a basic good: being connected (usually, via shared activities) to another conscious agent. This feature, which I argue gives a unified explanation of (at least part of) what is good about relationships of various kinds, also includes rivalries. Some rivalries, however, do not seem good for us. I call rivalries that are good for us 'healthy rivalries', and argue that mutual respect is sufficient, and arguably necessary, for a rivalry to be healthy. I conclude by considering challenges and topics for further work.

Comments by Julia Markovits (Cornell University)

Keynote Address: 5:20 - 7:20 p.m.

Grace Helton (University of Rochester): "Change and Constancy in Emotional Dynamics (with Grief as a Case Study)"

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that adults typically recover from bereavement relatively quickly. Is the human tendency to recover quickly after bereavement an impressive example of human resilience, something to celebrate, as some have suggested? Or is this tendency rather a regrettable trait, a sign of human frailty or fickleness, as some other theorists have worried? In this paper, I will scrutinize the core empirical assumption shared by both parties to this debate, namely, the view that typical adult grievers do indeed recover rapidly after bereavement. Drawing on a wide range of sources, including: population-level psychological studies, neuroscience results, and bereavement narratives, I will argue that while there are some respects in which most bereaved individuals recover quickly from their loss, there is another, important respect in which typical bereaved individuals never recover from their loss.

Informal Dinner: 7:45 p.m. (Royal Indian Grill)